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More Apparent Than Real: The Revolutionary
Commitment to Constitutional Federalism
Martin S. Flaherty*
A full constitutional account of sovereignty and federalism calls for
[understanding] the momentous constitutional issues at the heart of the
American Revolution ...
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal community has rightly appreciated the influence of the
American Revolution on the creation of the Constitution. In particular,
legal scholars, judges, and lawyers have noted that the nation's revolu-
tionary experience played an important role in shaping its commitment
to federalism. Akhil Amar, for example, notes that "the problem of
allocating power vertically between central and local officials," as faced
by the Founders, "had cracked open the British Empire."'  Steven
Calabresi observes that "[t]he American Revolution obviously also had
interlinked democracy and nationalism, but its final Federalist outcome
muted the connection."3
Whether tied to the American Revolution or not, federalism embraces
a bundle of concepts which are not always unpacked. Most broadly, the
term refers to authority-whether overlapping or not-exercised by two
or more tiers of government. A more powerful version, recently brought
back from the grave in United States v. Lopez,4 rejects the idea that such
divided authority may always overlap, and instead views certain
allocations between state and national power as exclusive. This Paper
will explore a still more vigorous conception. In this view, federalism
entails legally enforceable barriers or immunities that protect constituent
states from direct regulation by the national government. This brand of
the doctrine, which frequently posits some notion of state sovereignty,
can lay claim to substantial force in part because of the extensive
protection it affords state government. It is powerful in larger part
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. B.A. Princeton; M.A., M.Phil., Yale; J.D.
Columbia.
i. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429 (1987).
2. Id. at 1444.
3. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers ": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 758 (1995).
4. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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because it has been successful in a series of recent Supreme Court cases,
including Gregory v. Ashcroft,5 New York v. United States,6 and Seminole
Tribe v. Florida.7 This type of sovereignty federalism, perhaps better
labeled as autonomy or barrier' federalism, in turn draws special strength
from its apparent historical pedigree.
With certain variations, the conventional theme holds that the American
Revolution produced a keen appreciation of vertically divided govern-
mental authority, including federalism in the strong form under consider-
ation. Americans, the argument runs, wisely embraced this approach in
large part because they had defended their liberties by rallying around
their thirteen political communities to oppose a tyrannical central
government. The most extreme version of the account posits the
Founding as a "We the States" phenomenon: so committed were
Americans to strong local authority that the states ceded only so much
authority to the federal government as was necessary to cure the
weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation.9 A more modest, and
undoubtedly more common, version simply points to federalism's
revolutionary pedigree generally." Either way, the importance of the
American Revolution in the development of our federal system has
obvious relevance for originalists." Yet, it is also relevant for those who
simply desire to derive lessons about how American government should
function from how it has functioned. 2 Whether the point is original
intent or historical background, the conventional wisdom bolsters the
claim that "federalism actually might be by far the most important and
beneficial feature of our constitutional scheme."' 3
Recent historical scholarship confirms the American Revolution's
impact. In particular, historians have done much to show that a model
of divided authority was at the core of the patriots' case against Great
Britain. On this account, Americans resisted parliamentary measures in
5. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
6. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
7. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
8. These two terms are more accurate insofar as this type of federalism predated the notion
that states are sovereign.
9. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875-1914 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
10. This notion is also implicit in Justice O'Connor's approving quotation of Justice Chase's
statement that, "'The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed
of indestructible States."' New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (quoting Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725
(1869)).
11. See supra note 3.
12. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1994).
13. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 754; cf ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 4 (1990) (discussing the separation of powers and limitations
of the federal government).
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the belief that the "Constitution of Empire"' 4 established a federated
British Empire to which the colonists owed allegiance through the Crown,
which allowed them to govern their own affairs through their own local
assemblies and courts. The American commitment to constitutional
federalism, in other words, predated the Federal Constitution. This.
rediscovery provides fresh opportunities for those seeking to reconstruct
the Constitution's original understanding as well as for those who merely
seek to derive lessons from the Founders' experience. In the words of
another noted historian, Gordon Wood, one can "make little or no sense
of the various institutional or other devices written into the constitutions"
or the era until one understands "the assumptions from which the
constitution-makers acted."'"
So far those opportunities are mostly unrealized. For all its scavenging
tendencies, 6 the legal community has yet to consider this body of
scholarship and relate it to modem federalism controversies. Even worse,
legal professionals generally have failed to make any credible historical
assertions about federalism, whether about the American Revolution or
the Founding itself. Assuming that the point of invoking the past is to
confront it on its own terms rather than to bolster preordained conclu-
sions, it follows that a credible historical assertion must comport with at
least the minimum standards commonly employed by professional
historians themselves. As it happens, one of the chief methods is to
master the scholarship of professionals in the first place.'
Once this is done, a very different picture emerges, one suggesting that
federalism is far from the "most important and beneficial""' aspect of
American constitutionalism. To the contrary, this Paper argues that a
study of the American Revolution indicates that even at its height,
federalism proved to be a secondary device for protecting liberty.
Moreover, federalism's importance was progressively overshadowed by
more novel constitutional devices as the Declaration of Independence
receded in importance while the Constitution ascended. Part II contends
that the patriots' commitment to a federated empire, while central to their
constitutional thinking, became relevant only after the failure of
separation of powers in Great Britain and the impossibility of direct
14. Cf Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 1157 (1976).
15. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, atviii (1969).
16. See Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1591 (1988).
17. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725, 1747-55 (1996)
[hereinafter The Most Dangerous Branch]. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 524 (1995) [hereinafter History "Lite "]
(discussing early American constitutionality).
18. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 754.
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representation by the colonials. Part III considers the lessons that this
Revolutionary experience had for the Founders and whether those lessons
remain valid for us, their successors, today. This Paper concludes by
suggesting that, for the Founding generation, federalism represented an
increasingly outmoded doctrine most strongly championed by the losers
in the struggle over the Constitution, and that, for our generation, what
relevance federalism might have had has only diminished in the ensuing
two centuries.
II. THE REVOLUTIONARY LEGACY
A. Revolutionary Federalism
For a modem advocate of states rights, recent scholarship on the
American Revolution takes away, gives back, yet in the end takes away
again. The American Revolution's legacy first simply undermines the
hoary notion that the Constitution owes its existence to "We the
Sovereign States." That legacy nonetheless indicates that Americans
argued a powerful brief for constitutional federalism well before the
colonies had even achieved independence. The American Revolution
ultimately highlighted then and illustrates now the inadequacies of
federalism as a practical safeguard of liberty.
Whatever else it does, recent American Revolution scholarship should
prevent the assertion that independence established thirteen sovereign
nation-states, resulting in a confederation that was "not much more than
the 'United Nations.""' 9 This assertion is as old as Maryland's arguments
in M'Culloch v. Maryland"0 and as recent as the dissent in US. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton." Often the issue is posed as a chicken-or-egg
inquiry-which came first, the states or the nation-with advocates of
decentralized power generally assuming the former. Not that awarding
the states first place necessarily leads to a strong states' rights reading of
the Constitution. Analytically, the American Revolution is at least twice
removed from the Founding. It could be that independence indeed
yielded thirteen sovereigns, yet that the Articles of Confederation eroded
state sovereignty. It could also be that the Articles themselves established
no more than a league of sovereigns, yet that the Constitution itself
extinguished genuine state autonomy. That said, the debate may not be
dispositive, but it does remain probative. The existence of thirteen state
sovereigns in an original state of nature would at least create a presump-
tion that the eradication of such sovereignty would be more difficult or
19. Amar, supra note I, at 1448.
20. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819) (argument for the defendant-in-error, the state of Maryland).
21. i15 S. Ct. 1842, 1875-1914 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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less likely. At the very least, the idea of indestructible states present at
the creation retains considerable rhetorical power.
That image, however, assumes a clearly wrong answer to a question
that may have no resolution that is clearly right. Richard B. Morris, a
dean of early American historians, summed up a generation's worth of
scholarly work in arguing that a "review of the evidence makes it clear
that a national government was in operation before the formation of the
states."22  Before independence, delegates to the First and Second
Continental Congresses were selected by extralegal means by the people
of each colony outside the duly constituted colonial governments.23 At
independence, in effect, the Second Continental Congress ushered the
state governments into being by recommending to "the respective
assemblies and conventions of the United Colonies . . . to adopt such
government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people,
best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in
particular, and America in general."24 After the formal declaration of
independence three weeks later, Congress assumed the powers of war and
peace." It entered into treaties with foreign nations that were established
as the supreme law of the land.26 It asserted admiralty jurisdiction.27 It
even compelled national allegiance through treason laws, compulsory
oaths, and national passports. 2' For all these reasons, Morris concludes
"that the United States was created by the people in collectivity, not by
the individual states."29 He may, however, overargue.30 John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson, for example, famously disagreed as to whether the
Confederation Congress was a "diplomatic assembly."'" If the historian
does err, though, he errs on the side with the substantial preponderance
of the evidence.
Yet federalism did matter. This federalism, however, was older, more
sophisticated, and more powerful than any notion that the original thirteen
22. RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION 1781-1789, at 55 (1987).
23. See id. at 56-58.
24. 4 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 342 (Worthington C. Ford ed.,
1906).
25. See MORRIS, supra note 22, at 64.
26. See id. at 65-67.
27. See id. at 67-71.
28. See id. at 72-76.
29. Id. at 76.
30. R.B. Bernstein, for example, disagrees with the certitude, if not the substance, of Morris's
nationalistic account. See Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicentennial, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1565,
1580 (1987).
31. See letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Feb. 23, 1787), and letter from John
Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 1, 1787), in THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETrERS 174-77 (Lester
Cappon ed., 1987).
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states were originally independent sovereigns. This approach, which in
many ways was the first American version of the doctrine, became the
centerpiece of the patriot case against Parliamentary encroachment upon
the local affairs of the colonies. Moreover, that case was not merely
rhetorical or pragmatic, but self-consciously constitutional. Not more
than twenty years ago, the idea that the American patriots marched
toward rebellion under the flag of constitutional federalism would have
been dismissed almost out of hand. That no one dismisses this idea today
is the singular achievement of a generation of ideological, legal, and
constitutional historians whose number includes Edmund S. Morgan,
Bernard Bailyn, Barbara Black, Jack P. Greene, and John Phillip Reid.
Their achievement is central to any understanding of the American
Revolution, much less any account that focuses on government.32
Their account holds that the federalist case, not to mention the
American Revolution itself, grew out of two competing conceptions of
the English Constitution and, more specifically, two mutually exclusive
ideas of how that constitution applied to the Empire. Broadly speaking,
the divergence began with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the
Hanoverian Succession of 1714, which together established Parliament's
victory in its centuries-old battle for constitutional supremacy over the
Crown. For the colonies, Parliamentary supremacy could have led to one
of two basic results. Either Parliament would follow the dictates of
power and assert unconstrained authority throughout the Empire, or it
would observe the very constitutional principles it had used against the
monarch and respect the claims of colonial representatives to manage
their own affairs. As Reid observes, "the eighteenth century can be
termed the epoch of two constitutions in both Great Britain and the
American colonies, with the mother country eventually succumbing to the
obvious convenience of one constitution and the independent American
states consciously selecting the other.
33
By mid-century, Great Britain's surrender to convenience was already
well along. According to British imperialist thinkers, Parliament was
manifestly supreme and arguably sovereign over any territory that the
United Kingdom controlled. Supremacy meant that the imperial
legislature had the authority to make laws, in Lord Mansfield's words,
over "'every part and every subject without the least distinction' across
the Empire.34 Parliament itself asserted this claim in two "Declaratory
32. See generally History "Lite," supra note 17, at 542-45.
33. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4-5
(abridged ed. 1995) (footnote omitted).
34. JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 101 (1986);
see Campbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1049 (K.B. 1774).
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Acts,"-one for Ireland in 1720 and the other for America in
1766-proclaiming its power to bind the subjects of these dependencies
"in all cases whatsoever." '  The idea of parliamentary sovereignty went
even further. This doctrine held that the final arbiter of constitutional
limits on Parliament, including traditional limits on its power over the
Empire's constituent members, was Parliament itself. Though not
uncontested until the nineteenth century, parliamentary sovereignty
received constitutional endorsement from no less a figure than Blackstone
in no less a treatise than his enormously influential Commentaries on the
Laws of England. 3 6
These and other jurists defended these novel imperial conceptions on
several grounds. These included the familiar adage against an imperium
in imperio, or the impossibility of two sovereigns in a single system, as
well as the more shaky assertion that the colonies were "virtually"
represented in Parliament anyway. Regardless of their bases, it was out
of these constitutional assumptions that Parliament undertook its doomed
program of asserting its authority, starting with the Sugar and Stamp
Acts, continuing through the Townshend Duties and the New York
Legislature Suspension Act, and culminating in the Intolerable Acts,
Lexington, and Concord.
The Americans followed a more venerable conception. Until the
shooting began, even the most fervent patriot accepted Parliament's
authority to regulate trade and imperial affairs generally. Yet they also
consistently asserted that the principles of the English Constitution simply
restricted Parliamentary power to tax, legislate, or assert general
jurisdiction with respect to the domestic affairs of the colonies. As the
Virginia House of Burgesses resolved in 1765:
[H]is Majesty's liege People of this his most ancient and loyal Colony, have,
without Interruption, enjoyed the inestimable Rights of being governed by such
Laws, respecting their internal Polity and Taxation, as are derived from their
own Consent, with the Approbation of their Sovereign, or his Substitute; which
Right hath never been Forfeited, or Yielded up; but hath been constantly
recognized by the Kings and People of Great Britain."
This is not to say that the colonists believed that America had no direct
tie to the Empire. As the House of Burgesses indicated, however, that tie
was through the Crown. Citing Lord Coke's opinion in Calvin's Case,3"
American constitutionalists argued that precedent, custom, consent, and
colonial charters established the doctrine that once the monarch recog-
35. 6 Geo. 1, ch. 5 (1720) (Eng.) ; 6 Geo. 3, ch. 5 (1766) (Eng.).
36. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *93-110.
37. The Resolutions as Printed by the Maryland Gazette, July 4, 1765, in PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION 50 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1973).
38. 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
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nized the common law in any of the dependencies settled under his
authority, no law could be altered except by the King (directly or through
a royal governor) and a dependency's own assembly.39 As Franklin put
it in 1770, there was no subordination among the several parts of the
empire, but "only a Connection, of which the King is the common
link."40
Like their English opponents, Franklin and his fellow patriots invoked
an array of sources to support their position; only theirs were familiar,
old-fashioned, and backward looking. 4' The federal model that they
advanced in substance if not in name stemmed, they claimed, from
precedent, custom, consent, colonial charters, and the necessity of actual
representation.42 When Parliament ignored these constitutional limits time
after time, the only logical course was to resist and, finally, to rebel.
John Witherspoon later summed up the American position in describing
the British Empire as "a federal" rather than "an incorporating Union." '3
Moreover, the barriers that resulted were not simply venerable but
extensive--far more extensive than even the staunchest advocate of
states' rights would hope for today. The path to the American Revolu-
tion in large measure consisted of patriot efforts to defend particular
federalism limits against imperial encroachment. Without exception, each
effort illustrates the near absolute nature of American claims. Patriots
early on denied Parliament any authority to enact revenue measures.
Parliament's opponents later adopted a similar position with regard to
legislation in general.44
One especially illustrative limit is among the least appreciated today.
As far as the Americans were concerned, the Imperial Constitution not
only denied direct authority over the dependencies to the British
Parliament, but to the British judiciary as well. On the American view,
the sources of English constitutional law established the principle that
only provincial courts enjoyed jurisdiction over provincial matters. It
followed, therefore, that no appeals could proceed to the realm other than
to the Privy Council. This exception, however, was entirely in keeping
with older constitutional precepts. Unlike the House of Lords, the final,
and Parliamentary, court of appeal for British cases, the Privy Council,
was not really a court at all but a royal body. Since the Imperial
Constitution established the Crown as the sole direct tie of the colonies
39. See Black, supra note 14, at 1174-1200.
40. 17 PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 393 (William B. Willcox ed., 1973).
41. See REID, supra note 33, at 3-26.
42. See id.
43. GREENE, supra note 34, at 172.
44. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS:
PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (1962).
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to the Empire, America never opposed this infrequently employed
appellate body for colonial cases.45
Yet on just these grounds, patriot constitutionalists vehemently opposed
Parliament's attempt in 1767 to revive "the Act of 35 of Henry VIII," a
disused Tudor statute that provided that any alleged act of treason
committed outside the realm of England could be tried there. As Reid
observes, "Parliament was asserting the strongest claim to supremacy it
would make between passage of the Declaratory Act and passage of the
coercive acts. 46 Not surprisingly, "[s]ome of the most extreme claims
of the right of the colonists to be legislatively autonomous of Parliament
were drafted to protest the Act of 35 Henry VIII." ' 7 Nor were these
claims novel or even uniquely American. Nearly fifty years earlier, the
Irish House of Lords waged a dramatic battle to resist attempts by the
British House of Lords to assert exclusive and final appellate jurisdiction
over Irish cases. The Irish Lords lost, with the British Parliament sealing
its victory with the Irish Declaratory Act, the model for the American
Declaratory Act and centerpiece of Westminster's competing vision of the
Empire as a consolidating Union.4
In the end, imperial federalism was a seeming success, so much so that
Americans would have every reason to hold the general concept dear long
after the American Revolution. So it seems, at any rate, if an end to any
constitutional doctrine is the preservation of liberty. Imperial federalism
gave Americans a rich legal vocabulary that enabled them to resist
measures that deprived them of such fundamental rights as property, trial
by jury, and security. Moreover, the existing set of institutions that the
doctrine posited -local assemblies, courts, juries, and militias-afforded
the patriots practical means of defending their rights. When George III,
perhaps prudently, decided to side with Parliament's conception of
Empire, these means played a role in ensuring that the final step the
patriots would take would end in victory.
B. Revolutionary Alternatives
But the odes to "our federalism" should not commence just yet. More
fundamentally, patriot federalism counts as an obvious failure. This
conclusion at least follows if the goal of a constitutional doctrine is not
simply liberty, but contributing to a working system of government that
protects liberty. From this viewpoint, the model of a federated empire
45. See I JULIUS GOEBEL, HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1971).
46. REID, supra note 33, at 70.
47. See id. at 69-70.
48. Martin S. Flaherty, Note, The Empire Strikes Back, Annesley v. Sherlock and the Triumph
of Imperial Parliamentary Supremacy, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 593, 618-19 (1987).
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functioned only so long as the imperial government permitted. Worse,
when encroachments came, this model served to hasten rather than avert
a high-stakes conflict in which the results were far from certain. Matters
came so close to pass in large part because other constitutional mecha-
nisms had either failed first or were simply non-starters given contempo-
rary circumstances. Of these, the two that stand out above all others are
separation of powers and representation. The American Revolution, in
other words, was not just, or even primarily, about federalism. Rather,
the conflict occurred because other devices that might have insured a free
and functioning imperial system never came into play. In this way, the
American Revolution speaks to the limits of federalism as much, or more,
than its advantages.
Consider first separation of powers. Recall that the British imperialists
who opposed American protestations argued for Parliament's plenary
authority throughout the Empire. This imperial claim rested on a
domestic predicate. At least in its capacity as a representative legisla-
ture, Parliament did not seek to establish its supremacy, then sovereignty,
outside the realm until it undertook the same mission within it. The
timing is often striking. No sooner had Parliament rendered the Crown
subordinate in the Glorious Revolution than it generated one of the first
imperial crises by attempting to legislate for Ireland in 1698. A
generation later, Parliamentary Whigs made the Crown's subordination
permanent by once and for all displacing the tyrannical Stuarts with the
compliant Hanovers. On the heels of this domestic triumph, Parliament
first articulated its imperial hegemony in the Irish Declaratory Act. When
Americans resisted an even stronger Parliament just over fifty years later,
the immediate response was the American Declaratory Act of 1766. 9 In
this light, it is especially ironic that Montesquieu attributed the success
of the English Constitution to the doctrine of separation of powers just
as the English were discarding it. Put in his framework, the eighteenth
century witnessed the legislative department drawing all power into its
vortex at the expense of the executive in particular. This concentration
of power not surprisingly led to threats on liberty, especially where it was
most vulnerable. Attacks on substantive rights in America, Ireland, and
elsewhere in the Empire, in other words, in the first instance resulted
from a breakdown in separation of powers.
The analytic correlation is even more striking than the temporal one.
American constitutional thinkers stressed the imperial link to the Crown
for good reason. When the colonies were settled, English constitutional
authority tended to hold that only. the monarch had authority outside the
realm, particularly with regard to lands conquered from other peoples.
49. See Id. at 612-13, 620-22.
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That did not mean that the Constitution did not impose an array of
constraints on royal powers, not the least of which was the requirement
of local assemblies and courts. In this light, Parliament's attack on what
had been effectively a partial system of separation of powers did not just
mean that power had become concentrated in a dangerous manner. It
also meant that Parliament set about to displace the one domestic
institution that, in theory, had an institutional incentive for protecting the
interests of its possessions outside Great Britain.
At the time, few would have engaged in this type of analysis on either
side of the Atlantic, in part because it was still ahead of its time. This
was one reason that the doctrine never played a significant role in
opposing Parliamentary power. J.G.A. Pocock may have overstated when
he argued that one needs a vocabulary for a practice,"° but having the
vocabulary does not hurt. Montesquieu notwithstanding, contemporaries
instead analyzed the balance of power within the English Constitution in
terms of mixed government. According to this doctrine, Great Britain's
framework successfully balanced power and liberty by mixing the forms
of government associated with social class. Thus, the Crown embodied
monarchy; the House of Lords served the aristocracy, and the House of
Commons reflected the democracy--each one checking the other to
prevent, in turn, either tyranny, oligarchy, or anarchy."
Yet, even within this framework, Americans in particular diagnosed
Parliament's pretensions in a way that anticipated a more familiar
separation of powers analysis. As Bernard Bailyn long ago pointed out,
patriot commentators made sense of Westminster's policies in terms of
corruption. 2 Time and again, Parliament's opponents explained events
in terms of a small cabal of ministers who used the promise of govern-
ment posts, safe parliamentary seats, and even outright bribes to buy and
control majorities that would do their power-hungry bidding. Yet this
theme-preventing the concentration of governmental authority in the
same set of hands through the misuse of government powers-would
comport far more with a self-conscious separation of powers approach
than a mixed government analysis. Twenty years later, exactly this
concern would appear in the Federal Constitution's prohibitions on
persons holding "any Office under the United States" from being
members of Congress, or on members of Congress, during their terms,
being "appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
50. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION 3-5 (1975); cf J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND
TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 25 (1971).
51. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70-71
(1967).
52. See id. at 84-93.
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States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been encreased, during such time."" Together the prohibitions are
rightly seen as classic expressions of the Founders' separation of powers
concerns.
Once again, the role of the courts highlights the general point-here,
that the consolidation of power at the center of the Empire led to an
assault on rights in the peripheries. The English judiciary had never been
a truly distinct and independent department of government. During the
era of colonial settlement, the courts failed to establish the power of
judicial review of statutes while the judges themselves were royally
appointed and sat quod bene placent, at the Crown's pleasure. The
Glorious Revolution kept the judiciary subordinate but shifted control
away from the monarch, in part by rendering judicial tenure que bene
gerrisent, upon good behavior. Significantly, the English House of
Lords-long considered the kingdom's court of last resort-mounted its
first assault on the appellate jurisdiction, an imperial dependency, not
long after the Glorious Revolution concluded. This initial assault, on the
Irish House of Lords, failed. No less significantly, however, a second
assault twenty years later succeeded when Parliament extended its power
still further by installing the present dynasty on the throne. 4 While the
British Lords never asserted the same jurisdiction over the colonies, an
even stronger Parliament did encroach upon the jurisdiction of American
trial courts starting in the 1760s. The Stamp Act, for example, sought to
extend admiralty jurisdiction at the expense of both local common law
trial courts and the juries that went with them.55 As noted, the revival of
3 5 Henry VIII attempted to deprive colonial courts of treason jurisdiction
altogether.
While separation of powers may only have been indirectly invoked at
best, representation was debated and discarded by each side. Paradoxical-
ly, each side also agreed that the colonial representation at Westminster
would all but solve the constitutional conflict. By the mid-eighteenth
century, few principles of English constitutionalism seem more firmly
established than the tenet that representation in a lawmaking assembly
was both a right in itself and the best means of protecting other rights.56
It was in part on the strength of this doctrine that Parliament was able to
wrest more authority from the Crown during the previous hundred years.
Were the colonists to send representatives to Westminster, it followed that
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
54. See Flaherty, supra note 48, at 603-22.
55. See MORGAN & MORGAN, supra note 44, at 24.
56. See History "Lite, "supra note 17, at 564. See generally JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT
OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1989).
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one of their principal rights would have been realized, and with it a way
of safeguarding all others.
The trouble was that one side thought that the problem had already
been solved and the other thought that it never could be. British
imperialists famously countered American federal claims with the
argument that the colonists were already virtually represented in
Parliament. During the Stamp Act crisis, Soame Jenyns set forth the
ministry's position in asking: "If the towns of Manchester and Birming-
ham, sending no representatives to Parliament, are notwithstanding there
represented, why are not the cities of Albany and Boston equally
represented in that Assembly?"57 The colonists themselves of course
never accepted this fiction. Responding directly to Jenyns, Daniel Dulany
argued that "the notion of a virtual representation of the colonies ... is
a mere cob-web, spread to snatch the unwary, and entangle the weak.""
Nor, the patriots further argued, was sending actual representatives to
Parliament an option.
Americans denied Parliament's capacity to represent them for several
reasons. Their own experience of actual representation in government,
which was far more representative than Britain's own experience,
rendered the claim of virtual representation simply untenable. The three-
week voyage across the Atlantic, moreover, would have made it nearly
impossible for any American MPs to conduct their business with their
constituents even were Parliament to accept the idea. Finally, some
patriots admitted that they themselves would not necessarily accept
American representation in Parliament on the ground that colonial MPs
would be nothing more than a consistently outvoted regional minority
given Great Britain's still significantly greater population. 9
Only at the eleventh hour did anyone seriously propose representation
as a way out of the imperial impasse. Late in 1774, Joseph Galloway of
Pennsylvania placed before the Continental Congress a Plan of Union,
that would establish a Grand Council-essentially a colonial parlia-
ment-that would regulate American affairs in conjunction with the
British Parliament. Under the plan, the colonial assemblies would choose
members of the Grand Council on a proportional basis. Galloway's
proposed constitutional revision compromised the American position by
57. Soame Jenyns, The Objections to the Taxation of our American Colonies by the Legislature
of Great Britain, in SOURCES & DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788
AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 18, 20 (Samuel Eliot Morrison ed., 1977).
58. Daniel Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of imposing Taxes in the British Colonies,
for the purpose of Raising a Revenue, by Act of Parliament, in SOURCES & DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 57, at 24, 26.
59. See MORGAN & MORGAN, supra note 44, at 80-86, 262-64.
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admitting Parliament's authority, yet likewise compromised British claims
requiring the assent of a representative American assembly before
exercising jurisdiction over "the affairs of the colonies, in which Great
Britain and the colonies, or any of them, the colonies in general, or more
than one colony, are in any manner concerned." '6 Perhaps not surprising-
ly, the Plan further tied representation to regulation of courts, adding that
the Grand Council's jurisdiction would also extend to "criminal and civil"
matters.6 ' In this way, too, Galloway's Plan relaxed American federalism
limits in consideration of a representative stake in imperial policymaking.
The Plan of Union came too late in the course of affairs for actual
representation on an imperial basis to gain acceptance by either side.62
With this constitutional option rejected, and separation of powers only
dimly perceived, the patriot's constitutional commitment to federalism
remained central. That commitment, however, hastened rather than
averted a war in which the fate of American rights would be left to
military circumstance. This experience would suggest that the
Revolution's legacy undermines the view that "federalism actually might
be by far the most important and beneficial feature of our constitutional
scheme." 3
III. FOUNDING LESSONS
A. Original Understandings
Perhaps the first question that arises concerning this legacy is what
lessons did the Founders themselves draw? We today might come to
different conclusions about our Revolutionary experience because two
hundred years of subsequent experience may or may not confirm any
lessons that the Founders drew. But for an originalist, the Founders'
understanding of Revolutionary federalism is obviously critical. Even for
non-originalists, the Founders' unparalleled experience in applied
constitutional thought, along with their not inconsiderable acumen, gives
their views a certain persuasive, perhaps even presumptive, authority.64
The short answer is that more research needs to be done before any
account can be put forward with confidence. The longer answer is that
60. Joseph Galloway's Plan of Union (Sept. 28, 1774), in SOURCES & DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 57, at 116, 118.
61. See id. at l18.
62. On the Galloway Plan in general, see ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763789, at 245-46 (C. Vann Woodward ed., 1982).
63. See supra text accompanying note 13.
64. See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 859 (1995).
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there is every reason to expect that the Founders looked back at the
American Revolution as evidence that federalism at best made for an
ancillary and, to use Reid's phrase, increasingly backward-looking
solution to the problem of an extended polity when weighed against the
more forward-looking doctrines of separation of powers and national
representation.65 For one, independence permitted separation of powers
to come out from under the shadow of "mixed-government" analysis.
During the Critical Period, between 1776 and 1787, separation of powers
became one of the chief analytical tools employed by critics of the early
state constitutions. 66 It follows that this same, newly-created popular
device would serve a similar function when the founding generation
considered its recent experience under the English Constitution. For
another, the Antifederalists made sure that this experience remained under
consideration throughout the Ratification debates. Patrick Henry, for
example, struck one of the most frequent Antifederalist chords in
equating the proposed Constitution with Parliament, at one point going
so far as to say, "I would rather infinitely ... have a King, Lords and
Commons, than a government so replete with such insupportable evils [as
those under the Federal Constitution]. 6 7 Perhaps the most compelling
reason, however, is simply that more skeptical understanding of Revolu-
tionary federalism, at least on the part of the Federalists (who after all
carried the day), is what the constitutional history of the American
Revolution itself suggests.
The early returns indicate as much. Such leading Federalists as Tench
Coxe,6N Noah Webster,69 and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney" contrasted
America's former experience under the English Constitution with its
prospective experience under the proposed Constitution by emphasizing
the document's innovative approach to separation of powers and
continental representation while downplaying federalism or ignoring it
altogether. It cannot be stressed sufficiently, however, that these passages
are merely suggestive. As the legal community is perhaps coming to
acknowledge, credible historical assertions should not rest on isolated
65. Reid used these terms respectively to contrast the American-and, significantly, the
federalist--conception of the English Constitution with the British interpretation. See REID, supra
note 33, at 5.
66. See The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 17, at 1763-71.
67. Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 5, 1788), in SOURCES & DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUION 1764-1788 AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL
CoNsTITrTIoN, supra note 57, at 331.
68. An American Citizen (Sept. 26, 1787), in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 20-21
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
69. Giles Hickory, in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 68, at 669-772.
70. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, South Carolina Ratification Convention (May 14, 1788), in
2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 577-79 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
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excerpts, but instead should rely on some effort to examine whether those
quotations are representative, and still further should rely on some effort
to reconstruct the general context in which the statements quoted were
made.7' Yet, in part this task has already been completed. As noted,
these kinds of statements comport with the general structure and direction
of constitutional thought leading up to the Federal Convention. The
insights of Wilson and Madison, moreover, correspond with the work of
the Convention itself-in particular, its vigorous embrace of just the
mechanisms and insights lacking in the patriot case.
Consider, again, separation of powers. As noted, provisions such as
the Emoluments Clause reflected an ongoing concern about corruption,
a traditional patriot concern that anticipated a separation of powers
analysis. Yet what had been at best a peripheral doctrine in patriot
constitutionalism became a centerpiece of American constitutional
thinking by the time of the Founding. Where the early state frame-
works-much like the evolving English Constitution itself-pointed
toward legislative supremacy, the Federal Constitution famously enhanced
executive and judicial authority to prevent the tyrannical accretion of
power to the same set of hands. So thoroughgoing was the commitment
to the general principal that the Federalists and Antifederalists disagreed
only on how well the document furthered the doctrine, rather than on
their enthusiasm for the doctrine itself.
72
In similar fashion, actual representation, which had been considered
and discarded in the imperial setting, served as another cornerstone in the
national context. Soon-to-be Federalists insisted on this innovation from
the start. The Virginia Plan immediately recast the debate on reforming
the Articles of Confederation not just by providing for a government that
would act on individuals rather than just the states, but by assuming
direct representation of those individuals. Much like the patriots, the
Antifederalists never questioned the desirability of representation so much
as its feasibility. Patrick Henry once more sounded a common opposition
theme in stating that the new government would "oppress and ruin the
people" in no small part because the Congress would not be representa-
tive enough. 73 Nor was this type of objection trivial. No less a figure
than Henry's fellow Virginian, George Washington, famously broke his
silence at the end of the Federal Convention by supporting a last-minute
proposal that the ceiling for House districts be lowered from 40,000 to
71. See History "Lite, supra note 17, at 554; see also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER
OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 208-29 (1996).
72. See The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 17, at 1755-1810.
73. Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 5, 1788), in SOURCES & DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 57, at 331.
1008 [Vol. 45
COMMITMENT TO FEDERALISM
30,000 to make national representation more credible.74 In addition, as
Larry Kramer has convincingly argued, it would take the invention of
national political parties to make the system meaningful as a conduit for
local concerns to receive consideration in national corridors of power.75
Yet, in the end, the analogy to the unrepresentative Imperial Parliament
was untenable. Direct, biennial election of every member of the House
of Representatives alone belied the parallel. So, too, did the mediate
election of the Senate and the President, who in turn selected the
judiciary. In this way, the Constitution's supporters could make the claim
that the framework went much further and gave the entire government a
representative pedigree. As Gordon Wood points out, the Federalist
argument held that "all government officials, including even the executive
and judicial parts of the government, were agents of the people, not
fundamentally different from the people's nominal representatives in the
lower houses of the legislatures."76  Federalists, in fact, expressly
contrasted the Constitution's superior commitment to representation with
domestic British practice.77 Nothing would have prevented them from
making the point even more strongly about Great Britain's imperial
claims.
All this said, the American Revolution furnished far from the only
recent experience that suggested federalism's inadequacies. Though
beyond the scope of this Paper, subsequent experience diminished the
doctrine's place in received constitutional thinking even more dramatical-
ly. No theme is more central to the last generation of historical
scholarship than the Founders' disillusionment with state government and
the constitutional insights that resulted.78 During the Critical Period,
innumerable observers came to the reluctant conclusion that the state
governments had proven themselves to be sinkholes of demagoguery,
faction, and localism that infringed individual rights precisely because
they were close to the people. The idea that self-government and rights
did not always go hand in hand shattered previous constitutional
assumptions. As Jefferson put it, "an elective despotism is not the
government we fought for."'79 The result was a profound suspicion of
state government, disenchantment that was further enhanced by the
country's inability to present a unified front on the international stage.
74. See 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 641-50 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
75. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 1522-35.
76. WOOD, supra note 15, at 598.
77. Id. at 596.
78. See History "Lite," supra note 17, at 539, 547-48. The centerpiece of this understanding
is Wood's Creation of the American Republic.
79. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in WRITINGS 123, 245 (Merrill Peterson
ed., 1984).
19971 1009
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
This post-Revolutionary experience further enhanced the appeal of
separation of powers and direct representation."
But it also generated even more forward-looking, post-Revolutionary
alternatives to the federalist model that the patriots advanced. Of these,
perhaps the most celebrated-today if not at the time-was the argument
that Madison made in Federalist No. 10 that large polities are actually
less likely to result in assaults on liberty than are local polities."' Also
critical was the novel doctrine that the new central government would
only exercise specified powers, however elastic. Perhaps more important,
the Federalists refined relocated sovereignty from either the new Federal
or state governments or deemed it a power of the people who constituted
both.82
The judiciary again provides a case on point. Whether the conscious
result of the American Revolution or the Critical Period, the Constitution
dealt with courts in a way that would have made patriot federalists
blanch. Where American-and Irish-constitutionalists denied the
appellate jurisdiction of the Empire's highest court, the Constitution, by
analogy, commanded it. Such, in any case, was the expectation with
regard to Article III, an expectation immediately realized by the First
Congress in the First Judiciary Act and confirmed by the Supreme Court
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 3 Previously, Americans had held the
barrier against appellate jurisdiction as a sina quo non of the federal
system that they defended and under which they had lived. With reliance
on separation of powers and direct representation, among others, this
critical barrier no longer seemed so important.
None of this is to say that the brand of federalism that the patriots put
forward has disappeared. As has been suggested, however, the keepers
of the flame were not the Founding Federalists, but their Antifederalist
opponents. Continuing to view the American Revolution almost
exclusively in terms of federalism, Antifederalists discounted the
Constitution's reliance on alternative mechanisms and consequently saw
the proposed central government as little more than Parliament's
illegitimate American stepchild. Nor did this view die with the
Constitution's opponents. With varying degrees of intensity, it has
echoed through the rhetoric of the Jeffersonians, Confederates, the states
rights opponents of the civil rights movement, and the opinions of
Justices Powell and O'Connor. Yet, in the short term, it was the
Federalists who carried the day. The victors obviously were not about to
80. See generally WOOD, supra note 15, passim.
81. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
82. See WOOD, supra note 15, at 532-36.
83. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816); see H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 675-81 (1993).
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abandon the states as important units of government. The American
Revolution's legacy, however, suggested that retaining such units did not
mean retaining the rigid barriers claimed by the colonists. 4
B. Modern Conclusions
Whatever lessons the Founding generation took away from the
American Revolution, we of course are free to take our own. The
Founders, no greenhorns at implementing a workable government,
themselves did this all the time. Publius, after all, considered the record
of Amphictyonic Confederacy and the Holy Roman Empire not so much
for the original understandings of the ancient Greeks or medieval
Germans, but for the examples themselves. 5 This does not mean,
however, that current views need clash with original ones. Nor do they
here. Our modem perspective does nothing to undermine the meaning of
the American Revolution's legacy that was suggested at the time, while
subsequent experience only tends to confirm it. On the one hand, its
seems clear that the type of backward-looking federalism that the patriots
put forward proved to be an ineffective and precarious strategy for
safeguarding liberty. On the other hand, it seems equally evident that
whatever utility may lie in this conception of divided government appears
greatly diminished given the forward-looking alternatives that, for various
reasons, were not implemented at the time.
If the American Revolution is any guide, the type of federalism that
imposes absolute barriers. for the protection of constituent polities was
already backward-looking by the time the United States declared
independence. Not only did it look to the past in Reid's sense of resting
on an older constitutional idea, it also looked to a time in which it had
been workable, but which had already receded. So long as circumstances
inhibited Parliament from asserting imperial authority, the model of a
federated Empire appeared to succeed. When, after 1764, those
circumstances no longer existed, the patriot's constitutional case probably
did more to invite catastrophe than inhibit it.
For one thing, imperial federalism did nothing to curb Parliament's
assertions. The doctrine offered little to prevent the steady accretion of
power to the leadership of the House of Commons. It also afforded no
mechanism for advancing colonial concerns to that leadership or to
anyone else in Parliament-a task that was only sporadically undertaken
84. Except, of course, for the constraint of retaining states as a goyernmental subdivision to
begin with, a barrier assumed by both the Guaranty Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, and the
provision for equal state suffrage in the Senate, U.S. CONST. art V.
85. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 18 & 19, supra note 81, at 122-29 (James Madison with Alexander
Hamilton).
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by informal colonial agents such as Benjamin Franklin and Edmund
Burke. Instead, the patriot framework served to alienate Britons in
general through its robust assertion of the imperial constraints under
which Parliament labored, and in this way hastened the conflict.
Moreover, once the conflict came, the federated ideal turned out to be
a chancy way of protecting the liberties that the English Constitution
guaranteed. With no other mechanisms available, all that was left for
either side was to capitulate or gamble on war. Even here, at least late
in the crisis, the colonial-cum-state governments probably hindered patriot
efforts as much as they helped. As Richard Morris and others point out,
both American resistance and rebellion owed their effectiveness more to
novel, continental institutions such as committees of correspondence, a
professional Continental Army, and Congress itself than to notoriously
unreliable militias or often recalcitrant state governments. 6
Federalism, finally, appears backward-looking in another sense. The
nation's long experience, because the Founding tends to confirm that the
Revolutionary legacy was no aberration. Larry Kramer has aptly
suggested that what instead stands out is how rarely and ineffectively the
type of federalism under consideration has served its purpose of
protecting fundamental freedoms.8 7 While examples merit an extended
discussion elsewhere, echoes of the Revolutionary approach are few and
suggestive. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the Hartford
Convention, Nullification, Secession, and the post-World War II states'
rights movement all, to varying degrees, insisted on constitutional shields
to preserve state prerogatives and sought to marshall the states when
those shields were ignored. Unlike the American Revolution, however,
each effort was not only chancy, but either ineffective on its own terms
or simply an outright disaster. Whatever other purposes it has served, the
brand of federalism that achieved its height during the American
Revolution did not turn out to be the way of the future so far as
implementing a working yet free government is concerned."
This task instead would fall largely to the more forward-looking
doctrines of separated powers and direct representation. These mecha-
nisms rightly qualify as prospective not just because they were either
underdeveloped or untried through 1776. Rather, these devices should
today be seen as having eclipsed any commitment to at least rigid
federalism because subsequent experience has demonstrated their worth.
Whether they would have averted bloodshed and preserved liberty at the
86. See MORRIs, supra note 22, at 55-79. See generally CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTION-
ARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL ARMY AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783
(1979).
87. See generally Kramer, supra note 12, passim.
88. See id. at 1490.
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time can be no more than speculation. Their use since then, however,
has not.
Experience since ratification indicates that the Founders' confidence in
separation of powers was well-placed. If the analysis to this point is
anywhere near the mark, it follows that this doctrine should be seen as
preventing the infringement of rights before federalism constraints would
or could be invoked. This has occurred with increasing frequency over
time. Considered as a subset of separated powers, judicial review
furnishes only the most obvious example of one branch of government
preventing questionable assertions of power by the others. More
dramatically, the mechanism has worked repeatedly in preventing any one
branch from concentrating into its hands the powers of the others and so
meet the classic Madisonian "very definition of tyranny."89 Moreover, it
has done so under heavy assaults. Andrew Johnson for better or worse
prevented the Republican Congress from gutting the presidency. The
Supreme Court did much the same in successfully resisting F.D.R.'s
court-packing plan. Such successes stand in marked contrast to the
failure of the states previously discussed.
Representation provides an even clearer case. At least early in the
Republic's history, continued reliance on the backward-looking, together
with increasing reliance on forward-looking counterparts, suggested the
relative efficacy of each. Perhaps the most dramatic comparison involved
the Alien and Sedition Acts. Here figures no less imposing than Madison
and Jefferson attempted to preserve liberty through a state-based strategy
that echoed the American Revolution. Taking a leaf from Patrick Henry,
the two men famously engineered resolutions by the Virginia and
Kentucky legislatures condemning Federal tyranny, expressing the
doctrine that each state was as fully competent as the Federal government
to interpret the Constitution, and calling on the other states to consider
nullification of the controversial statutes.90 No state did, and this strategy
generally fizzled. What did not fizzle, however, was the opposition's
other, innovative approach. Both Jefferson and Madison redoubled
efforts, then already underway, to organize a national movement to unseat
President Adams and the Federalist Congress in the next national
elections.9 It was this strategy that worked. The Jeffersonians were
swept into power in 1800 and allowed the hated acts to expire. 92 This
tack of course would not have been possible were there not direct
elections to the central government to begin with. And, as Kramer notes,
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 81, at 301 (James Madison).
90. See generally DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 393-424 (1962).
91. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 1519-20.
92. See MALONE, supra note 90, at 393-424.
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Americans who would achieve similar success in the future tended to go
with what worked.93
IV. CONCLUSION
History papers conventionally end with a call for further study. This
one is no exception. This Paper in particular requires further research on
its own terms, especially with regard to the Founders' understanding of
the American Revolution that many of them had so recently undertaken.
More importantly, legal academics interested in "using" the past to gain
a better understanding of American federalism have, for the most part, yet
to employ an entire generation of historical scholarship toward that end
with even minimal credibility. This Paper attempts a start. Yet, while
several aspects remain provisional, the central conclusion is not. As a
uniquely American contribution to the protection of liberty, federalism
has long been more apparent than real.
93. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 1519.
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